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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS-COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE: INSEVER-

ABLE AND UNREASONABLE COVENANTS NOT To COMPETE MAY BE
ENFORCED To A REASONABLE ExmNT.-Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d

307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968).
Plaintiff-employer sought to prevent defendant-employee from competing with him in the horseshoeing business within a proscribed area
and time as set forth in an employment agreement between them.' The
trial court found the area of restriction to be excessive and thus unreasonable and refused to modify the covenant not to compete. It held
that the unreasonable restriction was not severable from the remainder
of the covenant and that the whole covenant was thus unenforceable.
Plaintiff appealed, claiming error in the findings of unreasonableness
and indivisibility and in the refusal to modify or enforce the covenant.3
The Washington Supreme Court upheld the finding of unreasonableness but rejected the divisibility test as a criterion for judicial enforcement. The case was remanded with instructions to enforce time and
area restrictions that would be reasonable under the circumstances.
Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968).
Covenants not to compete have been discussed extensively by the
Washington courts.4 But before Wood it had not been concluded that
such covenants, unreasonable as written, should be enforced to the extent they can be made reasonable by judicial modification. In Wood the
court identified traditional contract issues' and asked one additional
'The original agreement read:
[F]or a period of five years from and after the time he shall leave the . .. employer [Wood], either if by resignation or by discharge, that he shall not engage
directly or indirectly in any business or enterprise the nature of which is competitive
to the very employers [sic] business, that is to say he shall not engage in the
practice of Horseshoeing or Blacksmithing, within a radius of one hundred (100)
miles from the Oakwood Horseshoeing presently situated at Route 1, Box 1491,
or any branch of the Oakwood Horseshoeing during the tenure of this time.
Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d 307, 308, 438 P.2d 587, 588 (1968).
'Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d 307, 309, 438 P.2d 587, 588 (1968).
'Brief for Appellant at 5, Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d 307, 438 P.2d 587 (1968).
'National School Studios v. Superior School Photo Service, 40 Wn. 2d 263, 242 P.2d
756 (1952); Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P.2d 273 (1934); Racine v. Bender,
141 Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927).

'These included: "(1) fa]re the restrictive covenants not to compete after termination
of employment void for reasons of public policy? (2) if such covenants are not void,
were the covenants in this contract supported by adequate consideration? (3) if supported by adequate consideration, were the restrictions reasonable as to time and area
as to both the parties and the public? . . ." Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d 307, 309, 438
P.2d 587, 589 (1968).
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question, viz., "... . if the restrictions [in the covenant] were unrea-

sonable, can a court exercising its equity jurisdiction modify such restrictive covenants and enforce them in a more reasonable manner?"'
The affirmative answer given by the court is the subject of this dis7
cussion.
Traditionally, the enforcement of unreasonable covenants not to
compete has been made to depend upon whether the unreasonable portions could be removed, while still leaving enough of an agreement to
enforce. If what is unreasonable is not severable, there can be no enforcement; if unreasonable parts can be segregated out, the reasonable provisions remaining will be enforced. This approach has become
known as the "blue pencil" rule. More recently, however, courts have
sought to find a severability of thought rather than of words,9 and
some courts have even ignored the traditional test altogether, disregarding severability in favor of examining the reasonableness of each
covenant in the light of attendant circumstances."0 Implicit in each of
these methods is an effort to determine the limits of reasonableness of
the restrictions with respect to the employer, the employee, and the
public. 1
The interests to be protected are clear. The employer has a business
which in many cases is built upon goodwill and trade secrets. In order
to protect these interests from competitors who would "pirate" his
employees or from the unfair competition of former employees, he is
6
Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d 307, 309, 438 P.2d 587, 589 (1968).
'This note does not include a discussion of the significant problems in the determination
of reasonableness. This determination requires a balancing of the interests of the employer, employee, and public in light of the surrounding circumstances. Welcome Wagon
v. Morris, 224 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1955). For a discussion of the determination of reasonableness under Wood see Note, Contracts-PartialEnforcement of Unreasonable Restrictions on Competition, 4 GONZAGA L. Rav. 343 (1969).
"S WMLISTON, CoNMrACTS, § 1659, at 4681 (1937); 6A CoawiN, CoNTRAcTs, § 1390, at
67-69 (1962).
[Slome courts have held a severance in the thought expressed in the covenant to
justify striking out or ignoring so much of the promise in unreasonable restraint
of trade, leaving the remainder of the covenant valid and enforceable.
5 WNVLsTon, CoNTnACTs, § 1659, at 4681 (1937).
'0See, e.g., Mason v. Briggs Co., 221 Ky. 127, 297 S.W. 1106 (1927); New England
Tree Expert Co. v. Russell, 306 Mass. 504, 28 N.E.2d 997 (1940); Schmidti v. Central Laundry and Supply Co., 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Monroe Co. Ct. 1939); Burroughs
Adding Machine Co. v. Chollar, 79 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); 0. Hommel
Co. v. Fink, 115 W. Va. 686, 177 S.E. 619 (1934); -General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling,
208 Wisc. 565, 243 N.W. 469 (1932); Bromley v. Smith, [19091 2 K.B. 235.
'Schnelier v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P.2d 273 (1934); Racine v. Bender, 141
Wash. 606, 252 P. 115 (1927); John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 33 Del. Ch. 4, 89 A.2d
548 (1952).
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allowed to exact from his employees a covenant not to compete within
specified limits of time and area upon their termination. The usual
consideration for the covenant is the present and continued employment of the employee.12 On the other hand, the interests of the employee are to be free from restrictions which will impair his opportunity for advancement or threaten his economic freedom. Where he is
bound by unreasonable restrictive covenants not to compete he is for
all practical purposes tied to his present employer, for he cannot take
a similar job without risking litigation. The public interest is expressed
in the policy that attempts at overreaching or monopolization should
not receive judicial sanction. Since overreaching ordinarily occurs
when the agreement is the product of inequality of bargaining power,
it is natural that the courts should interfere when that inequality operates to the detriment of the weaker party. But it is even more important that such an agreement be restrained by the court when the restriction of the covenant is so unreasonable that the employee who
quits his job becomes a public burden due to his inability to find another similar job which does not violate the agreement. Monopolization
runs counter to the policy of free competition, a policy warranting refusal to enforce agreements aiming at monopolization of labor. 3 The

' RoseIlini, J., noted in the dissenting opinion that this consideration was very weak
since the defendant could have gotten the same training in a five week college course at
much less overall cost to him than was required of him in his contract with plaintiff.
The majority, however, points out rightly that the consideration is sufficient for the
agreement even though there may be a question as to its adequacy. 73 Wn. 2d 307, 316,
438 P.2d 587, 592 (1968). But see Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 28 P.2d 273
(1934).
' Historically, covenants not to compete were not favored because of the harmful
effect on competition and supply, but eventually considerations of protecting the established businessman began to prevail. At first these restraints were regarded as against
public policy from both the public's and the employee's standpoints. The public was
deprived of the employee's skills and he might become a public charge. At the time
courts were much more concerned about losing an active participant in industry since
the public interest depended to a great extent on each individual's production. This
was particularly true when master craftsmen produced nearly all of a given item and
the restraint of any one of them would seriously impair the supply of that item. With
the advent of better transportation and the decline of the skilled craftsman this problem
became less critical and the economic effect of one restrained workman became relatively less significant. As early as 1711 the distinction between a general and a partial
restraint was recognized with qualified approval given to the latter. By the end of the
nineteenth century the validity of an agreement in restraint of trade was determined
by whether it was limited as to time and area. The current trend is to disregard the
distinction between a general and partial restraint with a rule of reasonableness being
applied in each case. See Renwood Food Products v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 223
S.W.2d 144, 150-51 (1949) ; 17 C.J.S. Contracts §§ 238 et seq. (1963). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 515 (1932).
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critical inquiry in comparing approaches to judicial enforcement is to
ask which one most fairly balances these competing interests of employer, employee, and public.
The traditional "blue pencil" rule has as its base the rationale that
it is up to the parties to include reasonable covenants in their agreements. Under this rule the courts will not write reasonable covenants
for the parties in place of unreasonable ones. A rule of reasonable enforcement, reason the "blue pencil" courts, would encourage use of
in terrorem tactics by the employer. Since the employer is almost always the stronger party, he could include particularly onerous restrictions in the covenant in order to deter the employee from competing,
knowing all the while that even if the in terrorem tactics are unsuccessful, judicial modification will leave him with a reasonable bargain.14
Overprotection of the employer would be the result. A stronger party
guilty of intentional overreaching should not be allowed to complain
that his covenant is not enforceable. In such a case his purpose is to
rely on the in terrorem effect of the covenant to maximize the benefit
to himself at the expense of valid interests of the weaker party.
The "blue pencil" rule is hard to fault in cases of conscious overreaching; the difficulty is that the rule, depending as it does on the
mechanical application of the concept of severability, involves the
threat of overkill. When neither party is in a position to overreach the
other or when one in such a position has not used it adversely, then
strict application of the rule seems arbitrary. For example, bad draftsmanship by an employer could leave him completely unprotected if
the unreasonable portions of the covenant are not severable from the
remainder. This hazard is particularly emphasized when circumstances
" The English courts have traditionally adhered to the "blue pencil" rule as a result
of this effect:
Later English cases have clarified the "blue-pencilling" test, explaining that it is
not sufficient that the excessive limitation is separately stated so that it can be
stricken from the covenant, but that the unlawful clause must be merely an additional stipulation not going to the principal purpose of the contract. Otherwise,
the whole covenant is invalid despite the grammatical severability of the excessive
promise. The policy on -which this qualification is based is to prevent promisees
of superior bargaining position from deliberately extorting unreasonable and oppressive promises, stated in divisible terms, confident that they will in any case
secure the maximum protection of the law.
5 WILISTON, CoNmAcS, § 1659, at 4681-82 (1937).
Williston explains that the difference in emphasis between American courts and English courts is the reason that the RESTATEIENT OF CONTRACTS states the rule as invalidating the whole covenant only when the covenant is part of a plan to obtain a
monopoly. S WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, § 1659, at 4682 (1937).
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change and restrictions that were reasonable at the time the agreement
was signed are unreasonable at the time of the dispute. When the employer diligently seeks to include only reasonable restrictions but has
these restrictions held to be unreasonable by the court, his diligence
is rewarded by a judicial refusal to enforce the covenant at all. In this
way the penalty designed for the employer who would unfairly use his
position for his own advantage is extended to the employer who seeks
only to provide for reasonable protection.
Another difficulty with the mechanical application of the "blue pencil" rule is the ease with which it can be circumvented by the overreaching party. The employer who includes arbitrary or monopolistic
restrictions in the covenant not to compete will not suffer serious injury
if he drafts the covenant so as to permit severance of all of the unreasonable provisions. He can rely on the in terrorem effect of the unreasonable terms confident that even if these provisions are challenged
their severance will leave the other portions of the covenant untouched.
In some cases this problem has been attentuated by the application of
an exception to the "blue pencil" rule which refuses to enforce the
covenant at all if the design of the employer is arbitrary or monopolistic. 5 But if this exception is not applicable or is not employed, the
efficacy of the rule is undermined by the ability of the stronger party
to retain a skillful draftsman to enable an attempt at conscious unfairness without risk of penalty.
Under the traditional "blue pencil" rule there is no consideration of
degrees of unreasonableness. An unreasonable covenant, if inseverable,
is unenforceable in toto. Even if a particular unreasonable provision
is severable, that provision is unenforceable in toto. The "finding" of
unreasonableness is the only necessary determination on the question
of enforceability; the "degree" of unreasonableness is not relevant to
the inquiry. Thus, although the relative equities of the parties are examined in the initial determination of reasonableness or unreasonableness, once a determination of unreasonableness has been made these
equities are no longer considered.' 6
"This exception is based on the reasoning that where the design of the agreement
manifests an intent to create a monopoly, the whole agreement is void as against public
policy. RESTATE3.1ENT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932).

" Where the previously mentioned exception to the "blue pencil" rule is honored, the
court would, however, consider whether the design of the employer was arbitrary or
monopolistic. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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In recognition of the shortcomings of the "blue pencil" rule some
courts have turned towards enforcing the covenant to the extent it is
reasonable.17 In so doing, these courts have sought to apply equity
principles to achieve a finer balance of the interests of the parties and
the public. Under this doctrine, all surrounding circumstances, including evidence of overreaching, are taken into account. An unreasonable
covenant need not lie totally unenforced, it may be modified by the
court and enforced after restriction to a reasonable scope. This is the
approach of Wood.
There is a continuum of remedy under the Wood doctrine; enforcement may range between complete enforcement and no enforcement
at all. 8 The degree of enforcement is directly porportional to the relationship between the parties as shown by the circumstances of the case
and as modified by public policy. If the covenant is reasonable, it will
be enforced completely. If it is unreasonable wholly or partially, it can
be restricted and enforced only to a reasonable extent. However, if
the covenant constitutes an effort of conscious overreaching or an attempt to monopolize, it can be argued that the court can decide not
to enforce it all. 9 Under the rule of reasonable enforcement, there is
17See note 10 supra.

" Note the analogous approach, as regards unconscionable contracts or clauses in the
CowmXRCAL CODE § 2-302 (1):
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce
the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconscionable result.
UN3oaas CorinRcrAL CODE § 2-302, Comment 3 should also be consulted.
" The majority opinion in Wood does not expressly support this thesis. The court
did say:
The trial judge felt he was obligated to either accept or reject the restrictions in
toto rather than to modify them on the basis of his factual findings. We do not
believe he could properly decide the issues before him while operating under this
assumption.
73 Wn. 2d at 311, 438 P.2d at 590. It also said:
We do not limit the court upon new trial to any given formula for determining
reasonable restrictions, nor do we read any of the cases cited in this opinion as so
limiting a trial court.
73 Wn. 2d at 312, 438 P.2d at 590. Evidence adduced at trial might include evidence of
purposeful overreaching or monopolistic design. Nothing in the Wood opinion indicates
that such evidence cannot be considered. Thus, it is arguable that such evidence is
relevant and since relevant could suffice to support a decision not to enforce the agreement at all. A monopolistic purpose is against public policy. RESTATEMMNT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 515(c), 518 (1932). Under the "blue pencil" rule such a purpose has been considered
sufficient to warrant denial of enforcement as to reasonable severable provisions. RESTATEUMNT OF CONTRACTS § 518 (1932). It should similarly suffice to warrant refusal
to enforce the covenant at all under the "reasonable enforcement" rule.
On the other hand, there is authority supportive of the proposition that the "ten-

sales area, found in Ugmom
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available a spectrum of alternatives adaptable to the particularized
facts of a case rather than just the rigid single choice between reasonable or unreasonable, enforceable or unenforceable present under the
"blue pencil" rule.
The dissent in Wood argues that courts should be reluctant to enforce covenants not to compete in employment contracts because of
the unduly oppressive effect on the employee. 2 ° In effect the dissent expresses the concern that the employer will rely on the court to modify
unreasonable agreements if the Wood rule is adopted; that the rule
provides no incentive to employers to avoid conscious overreaching because the only penalty, upon a finding of overreaching, is to give him
the benefit of a reasonable bargain. Read this way, the Wood rule
gives the employer the unfair advantage discussed above-that is, the
ability to include onerous restrictions with the foreknowledge that the
court will enforce the agreement to some extent in any case. 2' The
dissent, however, disregards the fact that trial courts are well equipped
to handle these types of considerations, and can do so without sacrificing the interests of the parties or public.
With the Wood rule trial courts in Washington can look beyond
the memorial of the agreement in determining how to treat the parties.
In doing so they may determine whether a restriction to be imposed
dency" of the covenant to restrain competition is the only relevant factor-with "motive"
not being a relevant consideration. See, e.g., Palumbo v. Piccioni, 89 N.J. Eq. 40, 103
A. 815, 817 (1918). Cf. Amarillo Oil- Co. v. Ranch Creek Oil & Gas Co., 271 S.W. 145,
151-52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Motive being immaterial, the court could reasonably
enforce the covenant despite any monopolistic design of the employer. The language of
the Wood majority quoted above is consistent with the approach of Palumbo, supra,
if it is interpreted to refer only to the formulation of a reasonable covenant and not
at all to the intent of the employer.
It is submitted that the better view is to treat motive as a proper consideration. Such
an approach comports with the treatment of monopolistic purposes as justification for
denial of any enforcement to the covenant under the "blue pencil" rule. RESTATErNT
or CoNTRACTs § 518 (1932). It avoids the problem posed by the Wood dissent whereby
a monopolistically motivated or overreaching employer could draft onerous covenants
with confidence that at least reasonable enforcement would be obtainable. It also furthers
the policy of allowing the trial court maximum flexibility in balancing the interests of
employer, employee, and the public and developing the most appropriate remedy. Nothing
in Wood prohibits consideration of motive; courts can and should consider motive and
deny any enforcement to a covenant aimed at monopoly or overreaching. Although
this approach involves penalty for an employer actuated by improper motives, the penalty is amply justified by the need to discourage purposeful drafting of unreasonable
covenants not to compete by employers relying on the in terrorem effect and on the
assurance of a reasonable enforcement in any event.
'Rosellini, J., dissenting in Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d 307, 320, 438 P.2d 587, 595
(1968).
2 See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
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should be time-bound, geographical, or merely a restriction as to former customers. The court can even determine that only a special class
of customers should be included in the restraint.22 And upon discovery
of overreaching, the court should be able to deny enforcement altogether. Wood has given trial courts a free hand in assessing the balance
of interests between the parties against the background of the public
interest-a view preferable to that of the dissent and a significant advance over the mechanical approach of the "blue pencil" rule.
'Wood v. May, 73 Wn. 2d 307, 316-321, 438 P.2d 587, 592-96 (1968).
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